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Sentiment in the betting market on
Spanish football
David Forresta and Robert Simmonsb,*
aCentre for the Study of Gambling, University of Salford,
Salford M5 4WT, UK
bDepartment of Economics, The Management School,
Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YX, UK
We employ a sample of over 3000 bets available on matches from the top
tier of Spanish football in an examination of the efficiency of betting odds
offered in the on-line betting market. Odds appear to be influenced by the
relative number of fans of each club in a match, with supporters of the
more popular team offered more favourable terms on their wagers. We
report similar findings for a sample of games from Scotland. The results
contrast with studies of American sports betting markets but are consistent
with competitive behaviour by profit maximizing bookmakers in a market
where bettors can choose between several operators.
I. Introduction
In an early review of betting markets, Thaler and
Ziemba (1988) distinguished between weak and
strong efficiency. According to their usage of the
terms, a set of odds is weak-efficient if odds are
sufficiently reflective of objective probabilities that no
strategy exists that would give bettors a positive
expected return. The more stringent requirement of
strong efficiency is that no strategy exists that would
improve on the (negative) expected return from
betting randomly.
A substantial literature on sports betting reports
several violations of strong efficiency. For example,
Gray and Gray (1997), in an analysis of the betting
market on America’s National Football League
(NFL), noted a tendency for home teams and
underdogs to beat the bookmaker spread dispropor-
tionately often. However, bookmaker commissions
are high relative to what has to be paid to transact in
conventional financial markets1 and, as a result, it is
hard to convert awareness of such biases to consis-
tently profitable betting rules (Sauer, 1998). At least
weak efficiency therefore appears to characterize
prices in wagering markets.
The search for biases in spreads or odds has,
however, been rather narrow in terms of the
dimensions of efficiency for which tests have been
conducted. The NFL market is organized on the basis
of handicaps, so that bets are offered on which team
will record a better result in the match than the
‘spread’ announced by the sports book. In this sort of
market, researchers have focused on potential biases
in the favourite/underdog and home/away
dimensions.
Other sports betting markets are odds based, with
wagers offered on a win by either team at odds
varying according to their relative strengths. For
these markets, published work has concentrated on
bias in the short-odds/long-odds dimension (see, for
example, Cain et al., 2000, on soccer and Woodland
and Woodland, 2001 and 2003, on ice hockey and
*Corresponding author. E-mail: r.simmons@lancaster.ac.uk
1 In the NFL, each team is quoted at odds of 10/11 to beat the spread. With equal money wagered on each side, bookmakers
would earn 10% of amount won by bettors (this is termed ‘vigorish’) or 4.55% of total stakes.






























baseball, respectively) or on home team bias (Dixon
and Coles, 1997, Dobson and Goddard, 2003, ch. 8.3,
both concerned with soccer).
In this study, while we control for potential
longshot and home field bias in the set of odds we
use, our focus is different from that of the bulk of the
literature. We search for a species of bias that
mainstream finance terms ‘sentiment’. Just as it is
possible that the pattern in rates of return to stocks is
influenced by how well known particular companies
are, so it may be possible that there are systematically
different returns to betting according to whether one
wagers on more or less glamorous teams. The
mechanism that could generate such a result is
explored in Section II. Subsequently, Section III
offers an empirical model and presents results from
the betting market on Spanish Premier League
football, a league selected for examination because
it includes an exceptional range of clubs as measured
in terms of resources and fan base: such variation
should allow sentiment bias to be identified more
precisely. In Section IV, we check whether our results
are replicated for another league with very ‘big’ and
very ‘small’ clubs, the Scottish Premier. Section V
offers our concluding remarks.
The study of ‘sentiment bias’ is not only necessary
to make knowledge of the efficiency of wagering
markets more complete. We argue also that not
taking account of sentiment bias when measuring
other biases may lead to false inference. For example,
studies on American team sports betting, noted
above, report negative longshot bias, i.e. inferior
returns accrue to betting on short-odds teams. This
could be interpreted as evidence of risk-averse bettor
preferences. However, without controlling for possi-
ble sentiment bias within the setting of a formal
statistical test, it could just as easily be a spurious
result. On average, short-odds teams are the teams
with the greatest playing resources, which are
affordable because they have the largest numbers of
supporters. If bookmakers exploit fans’ preferences
as between teams to worsen the terms available on
popular clubs, this will deliver lower returns to short-
odds bets but the explanation would not in fact be
related to bettor preferences over risk. Our multi-
variate approach will permit separate evaluation of
longshot, home field and sentiment biases in the
betting market for the world’s biggest spectator sport,
where there is often strong emotional attachment to
particular teams. Such emotional attachment may
extend even beyond national borders as fans in one
country commonly select clubs in other national
leagues whose fortunes they follow simply to make
events in the foreign league more interesting.
II. How Might Sentiment Bias Odds?
In a pari mutuel betting market, the direction in
which sentiment would bias odds is clear. Suppose
one team in a match has many more supporters than
the other. If followers of sport feel a patriotic urge to
bet on ‘their’ club, there will be an ‘excessive’
proportion of stakes placed on the popular team,
driving down the odds to a level which makes betting
on the ‘bigger’ team a more unfair bet than that on
the ‘smaller’ team. To be sure, well informed
independents and professional bettors may recognize
at this point that backing the smaller team is the
financially superior bet but, given that organizers’
take-outs are as high as is typical in gambling, they
are unlikely to wager sufficiently heavily for the bias
to be eliminated (see models of horse and dog pari
mutuel markets with informed and noise traders by,
for example, Hurley and McDonough, 1995; Terrell
and Farmer, 1996; Vaughan Williams and Paton,
1998).
Avery and Chevalier (1999) were amongst the very
few in the literature to consider the issue of sentiment
bias in sports betting markets. Their application was
to NFL betting offered by Las Vegas sports books.
Their prior was that losses from backing ‘glamorous’
teams would be abnormally high. This prediction
relied on an assumption that the market behaved as if
pari mutuel because bookmakers adjusted spreads so
as to balance their books, i.e. their quotes were
designed to induce sufficient betting for each team
that they held equal liabilities whichever team in a
match beat the spread.
In the event, losses in the NFL market were indeed
abnormally high for bets on the group of teams
labelled ‘glamorous’ by Avery and Chevalier. But
whether they captured the process that resulted in this
outcome is questionable. We are advised by industry
sources that Las Vegas sports books do not in fact
seek to hold a balanced book on each match. We
know from investigation of bookmaker records in the
much larger illegal sector in the United States that
these bookmakers are accustomed to take large
positions, i.e. they often stand to lose heavily if a
particular team wins (Strumpf, 2003). And British
retail bookmakers regularly report big losses or wins
for themselves (sufficient to have a significant impact
on annual profit) according to whether the England
soccer team achieves or fails to achieve victory in an
international fixture, i.e. they do not fully adjust odds
to deter an excessive inflow of ‘sentimental’ money.
The reason for Avery and Chevalier’s empirical
findings, and whether the direction of sentiment bias
is necessarily in a particular direction, cannot there-
fore properly be understood by an approach based




























essentially on treating the market as if it were pari
mutuel rather than organized by bookmakers. Levitt
(2004) provides a more realistic framework for
analysis. According to Levitt, bookmaker markets
are fundamentally different from conventional finan-
cial markets in terms of the role of the market maker
who would in this case naturally be modelled as
maximizing expected winnings (i.e. client losses).
Levitt shows that if bettors have a preference for
backing options with a particular characteristic
(favourites in his example or, in our case, popular
teams), then bookmakers will adjust to this feature of
demand by increasing the price (i.e. worsening the
odds) on those particular bets. But there is a limit on
the adjustments to odds that will be feasible if
bookmaker ‘vigorish’ is fixed: if odds on the favourite
were shifted too much, this would push odds for the
outsider to a point where positive expected returns
were available for well informed professional bettors.
Kuypers (2000) also offered a theoretical model but
one specific to the context we examine: he was the
first to note the possibility that bookmakers may
adjust odds to take account of the presence of
committed supporters in the betting market for a
particular match. His theoretical model points to a
profit maximizing bookmaker setting odds in the
context of a market where there is a mixture of
‘neutral’ bettors, who share his own (objectively
correct) assessment of the probabilities of each
possible outcome of the game, and ‘committed’
bettors, whose views are coloured by their support
for a particular team and are over-optimistic about its
winning. This appears a useful framework to
represent the soccer betting market though we
prefer to think of the ‘fan’ bettors as capable of
assessing win probabilities objectively even though
behaving as if they had misperceptions: we interpret
their willingness to wager as taking account of extra
utility obtained by demonstrating their support for
the team in the betting market as well as in the
stadium. In part, their bets are motivated by a desire
to increase the extent to which they are stakeholders
in the club.
In his illustrative numerical example, Kuypers has
ten bettors who have decided to wager on a particular
match and will decide which bet to place according to
their perception of the value offered by each bet
(hone win, draw, away win). Four of the bettors are
neutrals and six are fans of Manchester United,
Britain’s most supported team. United’s opponent in
Kuypers’ hypothetical match is Liverpool. He has no
committed Liverpool fans in the betting market but
this is not damagingly unrealistic since the same
results could be obtained from assuming a mix of
committed fans whose average assessment of a
Manchester United victory was over-optimistic.
In other words, he is really examining the affect of
net ‘stakeholder’ support in favour of one of the two
teams.
Kuypers demonstrates in this context that book-
maker’s expected profit is increased by moving from
‘efficient’ odds to ‘inefficient’ odds (that implicitly
overstate the probability that United will win). This
has some intuitive appeal since the bookmaker is able
to take advantage of the eagerness of United
supporters to back their team by offering them a
lower pay-out in the event they win. However, the
model, like that of Levitt, is based on very restrictive
assumptions. Bookmaker commission is fixed and
determines how much money is attracted to wager on
a particular game. That money then distributes itself
between the possible outcomes according to the
relative odds.
The weakness of this approach in the present
context is that it may miss the point of including fan
preferences in the model in the first place. United fans
are likely to see a bet on ‘their’ team rather than a bet
on the match as the product being offered. In this
case they may bet in greater or lesser volume as the
odds are varied. Kuypers’ assumption, that their only
response is to switch bets (to Liverpool) at some
reservation price, appears as unlikely as a proposition
that, if United replica shirts became expensive
enough, fans would buy Liverpool shirts instead.
If one makes United fans interested only in betting
on their team, but with the decision on how much to
bet conditional on value, one could conceivably
(depending on the elasticity of demand with respect
to expected loss to a unit bet) generate a prediction
that odds on a United win will be biased in favour of,
rather than against, the bettor. Levitt’s caveat still
applies, of course: odds cannot be distorted ‘too far’.
Expected bookmaker profit from bets on United will
be maximized where demand for United bets is unit-
elastic; but, with a fixed over-round, the bookmaker
must also take account of the effect on net revenue of
lengthening the odds for Liverpool bettors as odds
are made more favourable to United bettors.
It is surprising that Kuypers did not test his
hypothesis that odds will vary with net levels of
support for teams in a match. We offer a test below by
including a measure of supporter numbers in a model
constructed for testing market efficiency of odds.
III. Evidence from Spain
We consider bets available on matches played in the
Spanish Premier League in the four seasons from




























2001/02 to 2004/05 (season 2005/06 was retained as a
hold-out sample). For each match, Internet betting
odds on each possible outcome, home win, draw and
away win, were listed, for seven different book-
makers, in an archive held at www.football-data.-
co.uk2. However, there were missing observations
since not every match had odds listed from all seven
operators. We chose to use the odds from Interwetten
since this was the firm with the highest coverage. This
gave us a sample of 1510 matches or 3020 possible
bets on a team winning a match.3
None of our results depends on using Interwetten
odds rather than those of another of the seven (all
internationally known) firms. Correlation between
sets of odds for each possible pair of bookmakers was
very high, ranging from 0.97 to 0.99.
Implicit transactions costs proved to be high in this
market. Overround across the 1510 matches had a
mean of 0.138 (with very low variance, SD 0.009).
Overround is the sum that a bettor would lose if he
wagered on all three outcomes in a match at stakes
varying such that he would collect E1 (winnings plus
return of stake) from the bookmaker regardless of
result. If the bookmaker holds equal liabilities for all
results, his earnings relative to total stakes will be
given by overround/(1þ overround), so bookmaker
commission on stakes here would be 15.8%. An
interesting puzzle yet to be resolved is why book-
maker commissions are so much higher in Europe
than in Las Vegas NFL betting, notwithstanding the
apparently very competitive market. The size of the
commissions implies of course that any consistent
bias in the odds would have to be very large for
awareness of it to permit bettors to enjoy positive
expected returns.
Interwetten odds are quoted in the standard
European format, known as ‘decimal odds’. For
example, suppose Sevilla is quoted at 2.20 to win. If a
E1 bet were successful, the customer would collect
E2.20 after the game (E1.20 profit plus E1 return of
stake).
An alternative way of expressing odds is ‘prob-
ability odds’, which is the reciprocal of decimal odds,
in our example for Sevilla 0.4545. This equals the
level of stake necessary if E1 is to be collected in the
event of a successful outcome for the bettor. The sum
of the probability odds, of course, exceeds one (by the
amount of overround) to permit bookmaker profit.
Probability odds themselves are not therefore to be
interpreted as probabilities implied by the odds. It is
necessary to adjust them by multiplying the prob-
ability odds on each outcome of a particular match
by a constant such that they do sum to one. These are
then the probabilities implied by the set of quotes
published by the bookmaker. We term each such
probability, ‘bookmaker probability’
(BOOKPROB).4
Preliminary analysis of the data indicated some
advantage to betting on home teams. Across the 1510
matches, the mean value for BOOKPROB in respect
of home wins was 0.456. However, the proportion of
actual home wins was 0.4805. This implies that, over
the data period, superior returns were obtained from
home bets.
We do not suppose that bookmakers mispriced
home bets because they wrongly assessed the value
of home advantage. Forrest et al. (2005) demon-
strated that odds setters were capable of processing
into the odds a rich variety of data relevant to the
result of a match, with at least as much accuracy as
the most sophisticated statistical forecasting model
for football that has so far been developed (first
presented in Dobson and Goddard, 2001, Ch. 8).
Any underpricing of home bets must therefore be
viewed as a deliberate commercial decision catering
to either the preferences or misperceptions of
bettors. But these preferences or misperceptions
may not relate to home field advantage per se.
Because the home team wins more than twice as
often as the away team in Spanish matches, home
teams are disproportionately often the shorter-odds
bet in a match and the apparent bias in odds may
in fact represent exploitation of bettors’ preferences
in the short-odds/long-odds dimension. Multivariate
analysis is necessary to identify separately home/
away, short-odds/long-odds and indeed sentiment
bias.
In our multivariate model, the unit of observation
is the individual bet that a team will win. 3020 such
bets were available. We estimate a probit model as
follows:
prob ðbet i winsÞ ¼
f BOOKPROBi,HOMEi,DIFFATTENDið Þ
2An access fee is payable.
3 To give sharper focus to the analysis, we include only home or away win bets, ignoring wagers on a match being drawn. Our
principal hypothesis is concerned with the influence of fan betting. The draw has no fans.
4 Let decimal odds for home win, draw and away win be dH, dD and dL, respectively. BOOKPROB, for a home win for
example, is then (1/dH)/(1/dHþ 1/dDþ 1/dL).
5 Away wins occurred in 0.197 of the matches while 0.323 were drawn. The proportions reflect greater home advantage than
in, for example, the English Premier League.




























where BOOKPROB is the probability of a win
implied by published odds6 and HOME is a dummy
variable set equal to one if the bet relates to a team
playing at home. DIFFATTEND is our measure to
test the influence of sentiment (or net stakeholder
support). Numbers of passive fans for clubs are
unknown but are taken to be proxied by numbers
of active supporters and so DIFFATTEND is the
difference in mean home attendance in the previous
season between the subject team and its opponent.
For example, Barcelona and Real Madrid are the two
most heavily supported clubs in Spain and bets for
these teams will commonly attract a large positive
value for DIFFATTEND. The largest value of
DIFFATTEND in our data set was 64.04. The series
was calculated from attendance data held at
www.european-football-statistics.co.uk.
The 3020 observations correspond to pairs of bets
(home win and away win) available across 1510
matches. In any pair of bets, if one wins, the other
cannot. In estimation by probit, error terms within
each pair of observations would therefore be corre-
lated. We allowed for this by employing clustered
probit which applies an appropriate correction to
generate robust SEs on the coefficients. Each match
comprises a cluster.
The null hypothesis of efficiency stipulates that the
odds quoted by the bookmaker should reflect all
available information relevant to the outcome of the
match. Such information includes which team is
playing at home and which team is ‘bigger’. The
coefficients on HOME and DIFFATTEND should
therefore be zero.
Results in the form of marginal effects (measured
from a point where the two continuous variables
are set equal to their means and HOME is set equal
to zero) are displayed as Table 1. Efficiency is
rejected. The marginal effect of BOOKPROB is
significantly less than one (at the 95% level) and
this implies negative longshot bias such as has been
reported in studies cited above for baseball and ice
hockey. HOME attracted a significantly positive
coefficient so that betting on a home team will
(ceteris paribus) be advantageous to the bettor. Of
course, the shorter odds team is more often than
not also the home team, so that these two biases
will tend to cancel each other out in the majority
of matches.
Our focus is on the variable DIFFATTEND. The
null hypothesis of lack of bias with respect to size of
club is decisively rejected. The effect is signed as
positive, indicating that, ceteris paribus, more favour-
able terms are extended to bettors on clubs with
larger numbers of supporters. This could be directly
the result of ‘sentiment bias’, with pricing taking
account of bettor preferences, or it could result from
odds setters giving too little weight to size of club as a
determinant of match results.7 We are minded to the
former explanation in view of the strength of the
evidence that football odds setters behave as if they
can process information at least as well as a
sophisticated statistical model (Forrest et al., 2005).
An alternative approach (to clustering) to account
for nonindependence of observations within the same
match is to estimate the probit model with a sample
comprising a single bet, selected home or away by
random process, on each of the 1510 matches. Of
course, exact estimation results will then vary
according to which bets are randomly selected. It is
therefore appropriate to execute the process a number
of times to check that results are robust. We carried
out 50 trials. In every single trial, the estimated probit
equation included significantly positive coefficients
on HOME and DIFFATTEND and a coefficient on
BOOKPROB for which the corresponding marginal
effect was significantly below one.8 The outcomes
from this approach were therefore the same as from
estimation with clustering.
In respect of sentiment, our findings differ from
those of Avery and Chevalier who examined NFL
betting and found that less generous spreads were
offered for ‘glamorous teams’. They also stand in
contrast to those of Strumpf (2003) who examined the
records of illegal New York bookmakers and found





Number of observations 3020
Number of clusters 1510
Pseudo- R2 0.115
Log-likelihood 1711.1
6As is customary in European soccer betting, and in contrast to the Las Vegas market on American sports, odds are available
about three days before a game and are generally held fixed until the start of the match. There is therefore no distinction to be
made between opening and closing values of BOOKPROB.
7 For example, for two teams with similarly poor recent form, it may be more probable that it will be the better supported- and
therefore likely better resourced club- that will recover by winning its next game because reversion to mean effects would
apply in its case. It is conceivable that odds setters focus on form and not on this mean reversion effect.
8 All references to significance relate to the 5% level.




























that terms of bets were made harsher (relative to Las
Vegas spreads or odds) for clients betting on local
New York teams which would have strong supporter
following in the neighbourhoods served by these
bookmakers9. Both sets of American results therefore
are consistent with bookmakers penalizing bettors on
teams with large numbers of supporters. In the
Internet market on Spanish football, the bias also
exists but, intriguingly, works in the opposite
direction.
In our discussion of the models of Kuypers and
Levitt, we showed that the prediction of an unam-
biguously adverse impact on odds for bettors on ‘big’
teams was dependent on the assumption that relative
odds within a match affected only which bet a client
would place, not the decision whether to bet at all.
We questioned the realism of this assumption. Those
betting for a particular team partly because of
emotional attachment may indeed be sensitive to
odds; but, if the price goes above their reservation
price, they will perhaps abandon the bet rather than
back their team’s opponent. If this behaviour
captures the nature of demand, bookmakers would
find it worthwhile to shift odds in favour of
supporters of the bigger team if they accounted for
a sufficiently large part of the market for that match
and if their demand were sufficiently price-elastic. We
note that the American markets studied by Avery and
Chevalier and Strumpf were monopolistic. All but
one Las Vegas sports book employs the same odds
setting agency, so that there is limited opportunity to
shop around for better odds. In the US illegal sector,
bookmakers prefer to take on clients for a long-term
relationship since trust between the parties is essential
when the service rendered is illegal. Again, bettors
lack an option to search for better value across a
range of bookmakers. The situation is quite different
in the Internet betting market on European soccer
(and indeed in the retail betting sector of some
European countries, notably Britain and Ireland)
where a range of odds from several bookmakers, each
with a strong reputation for probity, may be viewed
on comparison websites. In this context, it is natural
that, if ‘committed’ bettors comprise a significant
part of the market, individual bookmakers’ prices for
bets on popular teams, should be driven down to
levels consistent with superior, rather than inferior,
value for money.
Biases in the odds are then a feature of the market
on Spanish football. If they are persistent such that
they may be observed in one period and then guide
the bettor to superior (or even positive) returns in the
following period, then the situation would be
characterized as violating strong (or even weak)
efficiency.
Since ‘bigger’ teams attracted a price advantage
(ceteris paribus) over 2001/02 to 2004/05, we exam-
ined the returns in the 2005/06 season from a simple
strategy of always placing a unit bet where
DIFFATTEND exceeded some threshold level.
Table 2 shows the returns, with the threshold set
variously at 10, 20 and 30 (thousands). In each case
the result was a loss for the bettor but one that was
much less severe than the return of16% asso-
ciated with random betting.10 This confirms that the
phenomenon that superior value attached to bets on
‘big’ teams was not transient. However, the bias was
not sufficiently large to overcome the high overround,
so that the market remains weak-efficient even
though it is not strong-efficient.
The strategy of simply wagering for ‘big’ teams
does not however take into account all of the
information available from a study of seasons 2001/
02 to 2004/05, which suggest additional longshot
and home field biases. We next employed the
results from our clustered probit estimation to
generate forecast probabilities for win bets available
from Interwetten in season 2005/06. We examined
strategies of placing a unit bet whenever the
forecast probability exceeded BOOKPROB by
some threshold amount. So long as this threshold
was set sufficiently high, returns were again
favourable (relative to the benchmark) or even
positive (Table 3). But it should be noted that the
number of bets permitted by the application of a
strong filter is low. This is primarily because of a
tendency for the large sentiment bias favouring bets
on the bigger team to be offset in many matches by
the negative bias that works against bets with
short-odds.
It is striking, even with this qualification, that
positive returns could have been earned in 2005/06
from use of our model so long as the threshold for the
gap between forecast and bookmaker probabilities
was set above 0.09. However, where the number of
bets is small, there is a lot of noise in returns from
portfolios of bets. And when we looked back at 2001/
02 to 2004/05, it was found that a set of bets
corresponding to observations where the fitted value
exceeded BOOKPROB by 0.09 (or 0.10) would have
9 Strumpf found that bookmakers also price discriminated by further shifting the odds against clients (making telephone bets)
who had a record of regularly backing those teams.
10 Similar (small negative) returns would typically have accrued to each of these strategies in each of the seasons 2001/02 to
2004/05.




























delivered a negative rather than a positive return. The
profitable strategies in the hold-out period could not
therefore have been predicted from modelling for the
main sample period. Again, while strong-efficiency
appears to be violated, weak-efficiency cannot be
rejected: we uncover no betting rules that reliably
generate positive returns. This is unsurprising given
the size of the bookmaker take. Nevertheless it is
interesting that biases in odds are large and particu-
larly that sentiment bias works consistently in favour
of supporters of the highest profile clubs. Awareness
of this would appear to allow independent bettors at
least to reduce their losses by (literally) following the
crowds.
IV. A Comparison: Scottish Football
To test whether our findings might be particular to
Spanish football, we gathered data, from the same
source as before, for 907 matches played in the
Scottish Premier League between 2001/02 and 2004/
05. This time the odds used were from the bookmaker
William Hill, selected because it had the highest
number of matches for which odds were quoted in the
archive.
Preliminary analysis of the data again showed an
apparent benefit to betting on home teams (mean
BOOKPROB¼ 0.433, actual frequency¼ 0.456).
However, home field bias proved not to be statisti-
cally significant in multivariate analysis.
Table 4 displays results from multivariate analysis.
Again we employed a clustered probit model,
estimated over 1814 home- or away-win bets. The
estimated coefficient on the home dummy is again
positive but proves insufficiently strong to be
statistically significant. The marginal effect on
BOOKPROB is again below one but this time one
lies within the 95% confidence interval, so an absence
of longshot bias cannot be rejected. However,
DIFFATTEND is again both positive and statistically
significant. This is further evidence that bookmakers
take into account the size of a club when pricing the
bet and that competitive forces are capable of moving
odds in favour of large groups of bettors with a
nonfinancial preference across the set of wagers on
offer.
V. Concluding Remarks
The article has identified biases in odds available on
football matches in an Internet betting market.
Findings challenge Kuypers’ prediction that less
favourable odds will be offered for bets on more
heavily supported teams. More generally, they are
inconsistent with Levitt’s proposition that book-
makers will exploit bettors’ preferences adjusting
odds such that more popular bets are more highly
priced.
The reason for the inconsistency between the
theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence is
likely to be that the models developed consider bettor
behaviour after they have decided to bet on a
particular event and assume that bettors may then
decide to wager on either side depending on their
preferences and on relative odds. Where bettors’
preferences are nonfinancial, this is likely not to
capture the decision process of bookmaker clients
who, if faced with odds which are financially
unattractive on the one side and clash with their
nonfinancial preferences on the other, may determine
not to bet at all or else to seek out bets with rival
bookmakers. Competitive forces may then generate





Number of observations 1814
Number of clusters 907
Pseudo- R2 0.190
Log-likelihood 981.9
Table 3. Rates of return to strategies based on forecast
probabilities





Note: One unit bets according to whether ‘gap’ exceeds a
threshold level; gap¼ forecast probability minus book-
maker probability.
Table 2. Rates of return to strategies based on values of
DIFFATTEND




Note: One unit bets in season 2005/06.




























more, rather than less, favourable prices for those
interested in betting in accordance with non-financial
preference. These more favourable prices are revealed
by multivariate analysis of odds available on Spanish
(and Scottish) football when a proxy is included to
account for relative numbers of supporters of the two
teams.
Our recommendations for future research are that,
in theoretical work, further refinement in the model-
ling of bookmaker behaviour would be appropriate
and that in empirical work allowance should be made
for potential sentiment bias. Otherwise, analysis
may incorrectly associate apparent violations of
efficiency with other specific biases that have been
the focus of most of the previous literature on
wagering markets.
References
Avery, C. and Chevalier, J. (1999) Identifying investor
sentiment from price paths: the case of football
betting, Journal of Business, 72, 493–521.
Cain, M., Law, D. and Peel, D. (2000) The favourite-
longshot bias and market efficiency in UK
football betting, Scottish Journal of Political
Economy, 47, 25–36.
Dixon, M. and Coles, S. (1997) Modelling association
football scores and inefficiencies in the UK football
betting market, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,
Series C, Applied Statistics, 46, 265–80.
Dobson, S. and Goddard, J. (2001) The Economics of
Football, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Gray, P. and Gray, S. (1997) Testing market efficiency:
evidence from the NFL sports betting market, Journal
of Finance, 52, 1725–37.
Hurley, W. and McDonough, L. (1995) A note on the
Hayek hypothesis and the favorite long shot bias in
pari mutuel betting, American Economic Review, 85,
949–55.
Kuypers, T. (2000) Information efficiency: an empirical
study of a fixed odds betting market, Applied
Economics, 32, 1353–63.
Levitt, S. (2004) Why are gambling markets organised so
differently from financial markets?, Economic Journal,
114, 223–46.
Sauer, R. (1998) The economics of wagering markets,
Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 2021–64.
Strumpf, K. (2003) Illegal sports bookmakers, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Working Paper.
Terrell, D. and Farmer, A. (1996) Optimal betting and
efficiency in parimutuel betting markets, Economic
Journal, 106, 846–68.
Thaler, R. and Ziemba, W. (1988) Parimutuel betting
markets: racetracks and lotteries, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 2, 161–74.
Vaughan Williams, L. and Paton, D. (1998) Why are some
favourite-longshot biases positive and some negative?,
Applied Economics, 30, 1505–10.
Woodland, L. and Woodland, B. (2001) Market efficiency
and profitable wagering in the National Hockey
League: can bettors score on longshots?, Southern
Economic Journal, 67, 983–95.
Woodland, L. and Woodland, B. (2003) The reverse
favourite-longshot bias and market efficiency in
Major League Baseball: an update, Bulletin of
Economic Research, 55, 113–23.
126 D. Forrest and R. Simmons
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
an
ca
ste
r U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
6:4
2 1
7 A
pr
il 2
01
3 
